Threats of hostile takeover in context of the business economic security

Purpose: the article contains critical analysis and scientific review of research in the field of mergers and takeovers in the world academic literature and identifies the key factors causing the probability of losing a business in terms of business security in modern conditions of economic relations transformation. The following tasks have solved in the article to achieve this goal: scientific review and classification of academic studies on the problem of hostile takeovers in the interdisciplinary aspect of economic security have performed; key endogenous and exogenous factors that determine the threat of seizing business and the mechanisms for its protection against hostile takeovers have identified; possibilities of applying international experience in protecting against hostile takeovers under Russian conditions have analyzed.

Methods: the article uses a set of scientific methods for analyzing literary sources and statistical data, among which are: methods of induction and deduction, logical abstraction, causal, functional, system, historical and comparative analysis, etc.

Results: authors have identified endogenous and exogenous factors that increase the likelihood of hostile takeover, and have analyzed the impact of legislation and regulations on the activity of mergers and acquisitions in Russia and the world. The scientific review carried out by the authors is positioned in the existing set of studies and sets the directions for future research in the field of the economic security of business that are necessary for understanding this phenomenon.

Conclusions and Relevance: Russian and foreign studies in the field of mergers and acquisitions differ in the methods and form used to substantiate the findings and results of research. The problems of business security and protection against hostile takeovers have interdisciplinary nature, while the threats of hostile takeovers can be both external and internal. Improving the legal framework along with economic mechanisms will allow creating conditions for protecting the interests of investors, enhancing business activity and business efficiency. The measures used in world practice for protection against hostile takeovers are of limited use in Russia due to the relative youth of the phenomenon itself and the domestic capital market, as well as due to the specifics of Russian legislation. In this regard, it is necessary to continue further research in this sphere.

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