The methodological approach to identifying the quasi-market in mechanical engineering

Purpose: is to develop the methodological approach to identifying the industry quasi-markets.

Methods: based on the analysis of the concept and definition of the essential features of the quasi-market, the main methods of identification of this type of the market structure were systematized, and the author's methodological approach was substantiated, including the estimation of the cross-ownership coefficient in the horizontal, vertical and compilation projection and the coefficient of relative object demand. For the empirical analysis we used data from the Spark Interfax database in accordance with the OKVED classifier.

Results: it is shown that quasi-market structures are found not only in the markets with state participation, but also in the industrial markets that do not provide the state order, which is due to cross-ownership rights and the formation of affiliated companies of vertical and horizontal industry integration. Within the framework of empirical analysis, the methodological approach to identify quasi-market has been tested on the example of the markets of machine-building products.

Conclusions and Relevance: approaches to the assessment of quasi-market structures are systematized and the methodological toolkit for its evaluation are proposed. The theoretical significance of the obtained results lies in the development of the concept of the sectoral markets in terms of the development of theoretical and methodological basis for the typology and assessment of market structures of modern economy and interdisciplinary approach to the study of transformation of sectoral markets, which will make it possible to analysis, identify and model the development of the sectoral markets and market structures at the macro- and meso-level. The practical significance of the results consists in the development of the methodological approach based on the assessment of cross-ownership factors, the prevailing forms of integration, the size of object demand, which will make it possible to assess the presence of the quasi-market, develop strategies for industrial development and increase the effectiveness of adaptive measures of the government regulation.

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