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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mir</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">МИР (Модернизация. Инновации. Развитие)</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>MIR (Modernization. Innovation. Research)</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2079-4665</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2411-796X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>School of Public Administration</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18184/2079-4665.2021.12.3.274-287</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mir-1172</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИННОВАЦИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>INNOVATION</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Двухклассовая система формирования капитала компании в странах БРИКС</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Dual-Class System of Capital Company Formation in the BRICS Countries</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1690-8262</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Восканян</surname><given-names>Р. О.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Voskanian</surname><given-names>R. O.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>доцент Департамента финансового и инвестиционного менеджмента, кандидат экономическихнаук, доцент, </p><p>125993, г. Москва, Ленинградский просп., д. 49</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Associate Professor of Department of financial and investment management, Candidate of Economic  Sciences, Docent, </p><p>49, Leningradskiy prospect, Moscow, 125993</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">rose.01@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Financial University under the Government of Russian Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>04</day><month>10</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>12</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>274</fpage><lpage>287</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Восканян Р.О., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Восканян Р.О.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voskanian R.O.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.mir-nayka.com/jour/article/view/1172">https://www.mir-nayka.com/jour/article/view/1172</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель статьи заключается в определении текущего уровня распространения двухклассовой системы формирования капитала в странах группы БРИКС.</p><p>Метод или методология проведения работы основаны на использовании методов анализа, систематизации, обобщения. Также использовались сравнительный метод и метод синтеза к выявлению тенденций и закономерностей внедрения мультиголосующих акций в странах группы БРИКС.</p><sec><title>Результаты работы</title><p>Результаты работы. Двухклассовая система формирования капитала компании практически не изучена в России. В рамках статьи выявлено, что в Бразилии и в России, несмотря на обсуждение возможности распространения мультиголосующих акций, законодательство не предполагает возможности использования двухклассовой системы. В Южно-Африканской Республике данный вопрос не обсуждается.</p><p>Определено, что основной причиной законодательного разрешения использования мультиголосующих акций является необходимость развития компаний сектора высоких технологий. Иная причина заключается в массовом размещении акций иностранных высокотехнологичных компаний на американских фондовых площадках, обусловленном возможностью использования двухклассовой системы. Это предопределило внесение изменений в законодательство Индии и Китая, согласно которому компании сектора высоких технологий, еще не прошедшие IPO, могут использовать «дифференцированные права голосования». Выявлено, что индийский рынок – единственный, где на фондовой бирже размещены акции с дифференцированными правами голосования. На текущий момент три компании, прошедшие IPO еще до поправок в законодательство, используют дифференцированные права голосования, однако не в сторону увеличения, а напротив – в сторону уменьшения: «четыре акции – три голоса». Данная характеристика обусловливает торговлю подобных акций с дисконтом.</p></sec><sec><title>Выводы</title><p>Выводы. Гармонизация возможностей использования финансовых инструментов в странах БРИКС может упрочить экономический потенциал государств. Допущение использования мультиголосующих акций позволяет улучшать условия ведения бизнеса для высокотехнологичных компаний и снижать потребность основателей компаний в поиске возможностей прохождения IPO в юрисдикциях, где разрешена двухклассовая система формирования капитала компании. </p></sec></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><sec><title>Purpose</title><p>Purpose: this paper determinates the current level of penetration of the dual-class system of capital company formation in the BRICS group.</p></sec><sec><title>Methods</title><p>Methods: are based on the use of methods of analysis, systematization, generalization. A comparative and synthesis methods have been also used to identify trends and patterns in the introduction of multi-voting shares in the BRICS group.</p></sec><sec><title>Results</title><p>Results: the dual-class system of capital company formation in Russia is practically not studied. The article reveals that in Brazil and Russia, despite the discussion of the possibility of distributing multi-voting shares, the legislation does not imply the possibility of using the dual-class system. This issue has not yet been discussed in South Africa.</p><p>It has been identified that the main reason for the legislative permission for using multi-voting shares is the need to develop companies in the high-tech sector. Another reason is the massive listing of foreign high-tech companies on American stock exchanges, due to the possibility of using the dual-class system. This predetermined the introduction of amendments to the legislation of India and China, according to which companies in the high-tech sector that have not yet passed an IPO can use differential voting rights.</p><p>It has been receiving that the Indian market is the only one where shares with differentiated voting rights are placed on the stock exchange. At the moment, three companies that passed the IPO before the amendments to the legislation use differentiated voting rights, but not upwards, but on the contrary – downwards: “four shares – three votes”. This characteristic determines the trading of such stocks at a discount.</p><p>Conclusions and Relevance: harmonization of opportunities for the use of financial instruments in the BRICS market can strengthen the economic potential of states. Allowing the usage of multi-voting shares improves the business environment for high-tech companies and reduces the need for company founders to look for IPO opportunities in jurisdictions where a dual-class capital formation system is allowed.</p></sec></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>высокотехнологичная компания</kwd><kwd>мажоритарий</kwd><kwd>миноритарий</kwd><kwd>мультиголосующая акция</kwd><kwd>семейная компания</kwd><kwd>суперголосующая акция</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>high-tech company</kwd><kwd>majority shareholder</kwd><kwd>minority shareholder</kwd><kwd>multi-voting share</kwd><kwd>family-owned company</kwd><kwd>super-voting share</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lu L. The regulation of the dual-class share structure in China: a comparative perspective // Capital Markets Law Journal. 2020. Vol. 15. № 2. 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